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Tony D. Sampson is Reader in Digital Culture and Communication in the School 
of Arts and Digital Industries (ADI) at the University of East London, where he 
directs the EmotionUX lab, supervising research on the cognitive, emotional, and 
affective aspects of user experience. In 2013, he co-founded Club Critical 
Theory, an organization dedicated to the application of critical theory in everyday 
life in Southend-on-Sea, Essex. Tony is the author of Virality: Contagion Theory 
in the Age of Networks (2012) and The Assemblage Brain: Sense Making in 
Neuroculture (forthcoming in 2017), both from the University of Minnesota Press. 
He blogs at viralcontagion.wordpress.com.   
 
We are delighted to have the opportunity to talk with Tony about how his work 
touches on issues of imitation and contagion—a loaded term unpacked within his 
2013 book. 
 
Sam Fee: Tony, your book Virality: Contagion Theory in the Age of Networks 
seeks to explain networking behaviors that you argue have too often been 
inadequately captured in representational language. You propose that such 
language inaccurately describes human interaction in terms of identities and 
productions of resemblance, while assemblage theory offers a better way of 
describing behavior in terms of social encounter. First, could you describe for 
NANO readers how you believe that representational thinking falls short in 
describing the sociality of networking? 
 
Tony David Sampson: The problem with representation is absolutely key to 
understanding the social theory offered in Virality and my current work in The 
Assemblage Brain. The specific point made in Virality is that as a social concept 
virality needs to be decoupled from representational approaches that tend to limit 
examples of social and cultural contagion to their resemblances to biological 
spreading phenomena. When examples of non-biological spreading phenomena 
become analogous to biological contagion, the focus falls too much on (a) a 
discursively posed fear of contamination and desire for immunity, and (b), a neo-
Darwinian biomechanism imposed on social and cultural processes. These are, 
evidently, powerful discursive forces, but I argue that virality has the potential to 
describe so much more about new kinds of connectivity in the age of networks 
than those stirred into action by biologically hardwired fear and neo-Darwinian 
logic alone. This is why I revive Gabriel Tarde’s nineteenth century crowd theory 
to try to understand the network age. His social laws (imitation, repetition, 
opposition and adaptation) locate contagious forces as pivotal in the production 
of social reality.  
 
 
Although virality does more than represent the biological world in non-biological 
contexts, it’s important to add that I’m not ignoring the role of biology in social 
and cultural processes. Instead I attempt to collapse the distinction to a point 
where there might not need to be a distinction at all. That is to say, there are 
complex intersections between cultural and social forces and biological 
tendencies in virality. My focus falls instead on affective propagations, 
prediscursive, nonrepresentational and relational viral encounters. For example, I 
write about the affective viral capacities of empathy for new idols that crop up 
from time to time, like those that emerged during Obama’s election in 2008. In 
this case, emotional images of the Obama family posted online on the eve of his 
election helped to spread positive feelings toward the new president across the 
globe. For many of us at the time I don’t think we responded in an entirely 
rational way to so-called Obama love, but instead experienced it as an affective 
joyful encounter that made us feel like change was going to happen. The same 
kind of process is perhaps happening today with Trump, but whereas Obama’s 
virality felt like an encounter with active joy, Trump’s virus seems to thrive on a 
mixture of joyful passivity, anger and fear. It’s interesting to note, at this point in 
the US election, that Tarde regarded love as a far more powerful vector for 
contagion than fear. So there’s still hope. Whatever the outcome, both are 
nonetheless examples of the indeterminacy of what I call viral events.  
 
The point is that social spaces of propagation are where culture and biology get 
swept along by ongoing events. Indeed, it’s the event itself that is viral, not 
necessarily the things that are infected. The outcome of this approach is twofold. 
On one hand, we encounter a kind of Whiteheadean (following Alfred North 
Whitehead) concept of social space that is not about the spatial location of 
bodies and things that interact with each other. On the contrary, social space is 
all about interaction or encounter in itself. This is loosely based on Whitehead’s 
actual occasion—the event. On the other hand, then, I wanted to move away 
from focusing on things in space, inscribed with meaning and signification, to 
look at things in relation to events. 
 
SF: And second, could you offer a brief explanation of assemblage theory and 
tell us how it presents an alternative to understanding how the sociality of 
behavior from the molecular level outward? 
 
TDS: My use of assemblage theory is of course just one interpretation among 
others. It is characterized mainly by it being heavily infused with Tarde’s social 
theory of imitation. It is used to intervene in two prevalent and historically 
entrenched tendencies in social theory. The first tendency is to produce social 
categories and levels (micro/macro, individual/collective and interpersonal, 
group, mass etc.). Assemblages allow us to look at what traverses in between 
these social clusters. In a nutshell, the social is grasped as a process of 
repetition and differentiation, which produces social reality rather than fitting 
reality into these neat categories. Assemblages are always open to events that 
can sweep up a micro level interaction (e.g. the passing on of a rumor say from 
one person to another) and transform it into a crowd or network contagion. 
Likewise, viral events can disperse crowds or networks into smaller groups or 
isolated individuals. Again, in my work assemblages are used to conceive of the 
social in relation to events. The ebb and flow of a political campaign can be 
looked at in this way. Strategists will of course try to steer voter perception by 
way of tapping into feelings and emotions, and they can rely on, to some extent, 
voters imitating the opinions of others that influence them in this way. Yet, as 
much as they try to prime the mood (the affective atmosphere) of the campaign, 
these strategists cannot completely control the accidents that occur in relation to 
events. As my latest work points out, the priming of affect is becoming 
increasingly resourceful via social media, big data and neuro-technologies, but 
the imitative trajectory of a rumor, for example, is difficult to determine. 
 
The second tendency concerns a contested notion of emergence theory. Here I 
think Tarde is an early assemblage theorist in the way he challenges Durkheim’s 
social emergence theory in which an emergent social whole (the collective 
consciousness) transcends the interaction between parts. On one hand, with 
Durkheim it’s always the social whole that determines these parts. Accordingly, 
social interactions are generally shaped by the dynamic density of the social 
whole we are born into. On the other, Tarde’s social monadology argues that the 
whole is nothing more than a bigger part. Rather than wholes then, we might 
think of social clusters as a molecular clump of interacting parts or a temporary 
molarity that brings parts into relation while always being open to the affective 
force of events.  
 
To summarize, the main focus of assemblage theory for me is on social 
relationality and encounters with events. Tarde’s theory adds an interesting way 
of thinking about how the social comes together through imitative encounters. 
 
 
Tara Fee: How does assemblage theory help us to understand notions of 
originality?  Does a philosophical commitment to assemblage theory carry with it 
a rejection of originality as a concept? 
 TDS: From within the Tardean sociological frame I used in Virality it probably 
makes very little sense to talk about finding an essential kind of originality: a 
model, that is. Firstly, what is created and copied from social examples (as Tarde 
refers to them) becomes linked to a complex collective process of imitation. 
Tarde talks only of imitation and the imitation of imitation. The essence of the 
social is not the example that is copied, but the accumulation of imitation itself. 
Even if there were an original example in his work somewhere (and I can’t recall 
one), it would be impossible to find it in amongst all these accumulations; these 
whirlpools of contagion. It would be like trying to trace the origins of DNA to the 
outer edges of the universe.  
 
Secondly, and more importantly perhaps, finding an original model from which 
copies are made is a badly posed question for a Tardean assemblage theory. 
This is not to discount originality altogether though, but to instead think in terms 
of an original process. As follows, there are ontological commitments in both 
Tarde and Deleuze to a social process that is repetitive, but also produces 
difference or adaptation. 
 
This focus on repetition and adaptation is why Tarde is so closely aligned to, and 
evidently, a profound influence to Deleuzean ontology. The production of reality 
is similarly not grasped through a model/copy relation. We need to forget, as 
Brian Massumi reminds us, about the kind of simulacra that Baudrillard proposes. 
With Tarde and Deleuze we find no such thing as a one-off model of reality or 
indeed a series of resemblances that destroy this real model.  
 
On one hand, the model/copy relation assumes nothing more than a difference 
by degree. It’s the passing on of the same thing with slight variations. The neo-
Darwinian meme does this too by mapping gradual evolutionary changes. It is 
therefore possible to go back and find the real model from which these variants 
sprang. Baudrillard’s simulacrum similarly expands on this approach by 
developing a model/copy/copy/copy/copy ad infinitum. Although the original 
implodes under the weight of so many copies, there is still a commitment to it; 
even if it is destroyed. But again, by looking at this from an event theory 
perspective, we don’t find an essential real buried under copies because the 
spreading of things is the process that produces the real. Copies are not 
spawned by an essential model, but are produced by way of a creative process 
that endlessly repeats and differentiates. So this process of imitation, on the 
other hand, is not just about differences by degree, but the production of novelty 
and potential that might tip over into a difference in kind. It is the production of 
reality open to change. 
 
Similarly, Massumi calls the copy or imitation of a thing a mere way-station 
before a new kind of thing emerges from the event. So the answer to the 
question: is there an original is, following this logic, yes and no. No original 
model, but yes, perhaps an original process! 
 
Recently I’ve been thinking through this idea of an original process using the 
career of David Bowie. In the popular media Bowie has been presented as a 
one-off; a model rock star with so many imitators, but he was famously a magpie 
artist. Magpies are not originals; they are co-producers of reality. The magpie 
artist fits well with Massumi’s reading of Deleuze’s two processes of simulacra. 
To begin with, he is this way-station of imitation. He is captured by the topological 
relations that condition his style and music. Massumi calls this first simulacrum a 
“surface network of resemblances.” This is not a model/copy relation, but the 
actions of this process of reality. Bowie is caught up in a topological grid of 
cultural reference and exchange points—becoming standardized by his sensory 
environment. This is, in Deleuzean terms, the process of repetition or a refrain 
that repeats a pattern. Arguably, Bowie’s early career is initially constrained by 
this refrain. Later on though, the production of reality differentiates. It does not 
destroy reality—producing empty signifiers; it instead breaks out of the tendency 
toward repetition. It “turns against the entire system of resemblance and 
replication” as Massumi puts it. This is what magpie artists like Bowie participate 
in. They go with the adaptive forces; pilfering what gets passed on, repeated and 
imitated until a threshold is met. Bowie was an important artist, not because he 
was the original model—a one off—but because he cleverly tapped into the 
processes of art he encountered. He explored what potential comes from the 
imitation of his sensory environment. I suppose he stands out because he went 
beyond the way-station that many less successful artists get stuck at. His work, 
like his idol Andy Warhol, disrupted the flow of repetition and opened up the 
refrain of Pop Art to novel lines of flight.  
 
SF: How does your forthcoming book The Assemblage Brain: Sense Making in 
Neuroculture articulate the formation of knowledge?  
 
TDS: I’m not sure I go as far as to set out a complete theory of knowledge 
formation. My work has always been more ontologically rather than 
epistemologically oriented. But yes, by applying assemblage theory to brains 
there are some unavoidable conclusions to be made. As above, sense making is 
treated as relational, so I reject emergent cognitive wholes or indeed a model of 
collective consciousness inherited from Durkheim. In the case of the former, The 
Assemblage Brain intervenes in the often assumed emergence of a phenomenal 
model of the self, which is (a) similarly treated as an emergent whole that 
somehow transcends its parts, and (b), involves a strange distinction between 
the inner and outer worlds of relational experience; that is, the external world is 
often seen as nothing more than an image experienced on the inside. This 
returns us to the problem of representation and a Platonic model of the cave-
brain: a brain that can never have access to the real world. 
 
 
The initial focus of the book is however about contrasting two Deleuzean brains. 
On one hand, there are the discontinuities and mixtures of the Rhizome brain we 
find in A Thousand Plateaus. This earlier brain closely follows some of the anti-
reticular declarations of the neuron doctrine established in the nineteenth 
century. On the other, I look more closely at the brain that plunges into chaos in 
What is Philosophy? This later chaos-brain, although far more problematic to 
those of us who were attracted to the philosophy of mixture in their earlier work, 
actually raises some really interesting concerns with regard to possible 
differences in the way philosophers, artists, and scientists may think about the 
world. This is not a neuron-centered viewpoint. I’m not talking about structural or 
locatable differences between the brains of philosophers, artists, and scientists. 
But rather I’m concerned with a difference in kind in sense making in relation to 
how philosophy, art and science confront the endless possibilities of chaos. 
Moreover, the book suggests a number of ways in which these different sense-
making capacities can interfere with each other. According to What Is 
Philosophy? there are many limitations to the extent to which things can mix, but 
what I end up doing is drawing on current neurocultures in philosophy, art, and 
science to produce interferences as a kind of methodological approach. It is here, 
in these often-constrained interferences, where I find the politics of neuroculture, 
particularly as philosophy, art, and science intersect with what I call 
neurocapitalism.  
 
TF: What views of the role of culture and/or sociality are challenged by the 
neurological science in this new book? 
 
TDS: My aim in the first part of the book is to ask what can be done to a brain? 
For example, I take the emotional brain thesis—made popular by Antonio 
Damasio and Joseph Ledoux—and show how it has informed new modes of 
efficiency analysis in the digital workplace. This trend in the neurosciences has 
greatly influenced commercial design theory, marketing, and notions of what 
constitutes the so-called user experience. As follows, developments in emotional 
design and neuro-web design play a part in situating digital subjectivity as mostly 
unconscious or rather nonconscious. One interference I offer in this context is 
that of a revitalized Antonio Gramsci confronting a kind of neuro-Taylorism 
running through the history of human computer interaction. This is a series of 
paradigmatic shifts in which a worker’s brain, once free from the physical labor of 
the factory, becomes captured in neurocapitalism. Another revives the aesthetics 
of Aldous Huxley’s dystopic fiction to explore the extent to which 
neuropharmaceuticals and the introduction of neurotechnologies in education 
and marketing coincide with Deleuze’s control society thesis. 
 
The second part asks what a brain can do. This is a combined political and 
philosophical exploration of sense making. In the former case, I return to Tarde’s 
nineteenth century neurocultures of the somnambulist (the sleepwalking 
subjectivities of the crowd that resonate so well with the mostly nonconscious 
subjectivity situated in current neuroscience) and compare it to recent political 
events. At the time of writing the rise of rightwing populism in Europe, particularly 
UKIP in the UK, was a pertinent example of emotional and feely appeals to parts 
of the electorate that ultimately lead to Brexit. This sleepwalk into a 
disempowering joyful encounter is of course evident in Trump’s campaign in the 
US right now. My project engages with an ongoing question concerning an 
alternative neuroculture; that is, what does it take to wake up the somnambulist 
who seems to unconsciously imitate these feely encounters with a mode of 
politics that will ultimately have a negative influence on their lives. 
 
The philosophical and political come together with the problem of locationist 
tendencies in neuroscience where brain imaging science is crudely applied to 
locate regions or structures implicated in sense making linked to political 
preference, creativity, and even gender difference. What we end up with is a kind 
of neurophrenology which has been purposefully misappropriated by certain 
politicians to blame a dysfunctional society on sensory deprivation brought about 
by bad parenting rather than dire economic conditions. The book therefore traces 
a tradition of anti-locationism through Tarde’s panpsychism, Henri Bergson’s 
Matter and Memory, and Deleuze’s notion of The Fold. 
 
  
It is here with Bergson’s anti-locationist stance that The Assemblage Brain 
returns to the problem with representation. The problem for Bergson is that, on 
one hand, the idealist creates a world full of objects that exist only in the mind 
and for the mind’s sake only. They are the shadows on Plato’s cave wall. I call 
this the problematic cave-brain. It’s the brain Thomas Metzinger uses in his 
phenomenal neurophilosophy. Bergson’s point is that objects do exist 
independently of the consciousness that perceives them. However, on the other 
hand, real objects do not materialize outside of our experience of them. That is to 
say, we cannot separate the experience of objects from the production of color 
via the eye and brain, for example. So our sense making of objects is more than 
the idealist’s representation and less than the realist’s real thing. So in between 
representation and the real thing we find what Bergson calls the image. The brain 
and body are images, matter is an image. Everything is an image. The brain’s 
encounter with matter is that of an image encountering another image. This is 
pictorial, but there’s no magic representational image in between or beyond the 
material relation between images. Why should we assume that because objects 
appear to us pictorially they also exist as a magic representation in the mind or 
exist outside of experience?  
 
This is not to say that we do not think transparently. Brain processes seem to 
work so that the perception of matter appears coherently to us. It is like a filtered 
experience of reality, if you like. Deleuze says the brain is like an umbrella that 
protects us from the endless possibilities of chaos. Perhaps this is because 
objective reality is too much to take in? The endless possibilities of the events 
encountered are just too chaotic. But this transparency does not mean that the 
images we perceive exist, as realists might say, outside of experience, in the 
real. Images are not independent of each other’s experience. Of course, the 
world appears to us as coherent. It’s just that there’s no need for a phenomenal 
separation between images or indeed, a world of images that have a place in 
reality unknown to us. This is something that science tends to do very well for us. 
We can start to see through brain transparency with science. Yes, sense making 
seems to be in “consciousness” as a kind of first person phenomenal state of 
encounter, but there is not necessarily a phenomenal location in the brain that 
contains a storehouse of these images as representations or indeed a self-
image. Neuroimaging has not discovered this photographic store in the brain.  
 
So in place of the kind of representational world conjured up in semiotics and 
acts of signification, or indeed metaphorical language, wherein objects seem to 
be inscribed with representational meaning, The Assemblage Brain looks instead 
for the material relationality between objects – how, that is, one image 
encounters the other. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, it is not the person, but the 
brain that thinks. We are brain matter in constant duration with matter we 
experience. 
 
TF: How, then, should your work reconstruct a layperson’s understanding of 
imitation as a form of social relation?  
 
 
TDS: Imitation is, at the same time, a cultural inclination and biological tendency. 
It is arguably more important to the development of our sense-making capacity 
than language. Indeed, without the imitation of language there would be no 
semantics by which we could make sense of the world. Indeed, this sense of self 
we describe to our self and experience as somehow being inside us (our identity) 
is perhaps just a product of imitating what’s out there in our sensory environment. 
 
This tendency to imitate makes us vulnerable to what we encounter in sensory 
environments that are increasingly mediated to us through a digital culture 
managed by marketers, experience designers, and political strategists informed 
by neuroscience. This makes us open to adaptations that are mostly beyond our 
control. There is, as such, a need to make sense of new forms of 
neuropersuasion that seem to exploit what Tarde called imitation-suggestibility; 
that is, a mostly nonconscious tendency to imitate and pass-on what is 
suggested to us. 
 
Understanding how we become situated as subjects in neurocapitalism requires 
us to grasp that it is not just us, but our social relations that are being steered 
and put up for sale. Social media businesses like Facebook are already 
manipulating our shared emotional experiences and evidently engaged in trying 
to make these experiences become contagious. Indeed, recent efforts by 
Facebook differ from older methods of advertising. Marketing today is no longer 
simply engaged with appealing to our conscious sense of self identity. What is 
being mobilized is the mediating force of shared experience—an experience of 
the other and the sensory environments in which social encounters take place. It 
is these experiences that are passed on. It’s the somnambulist! 
 
Finally, I think it’s important to realize the power of our sense-making capacity to 
discern between fearmongering and the often joyful encounters we have with 
marketers and politicians. Both of these contagions have the potential to 
disempower us, but I think we are more easily fooled by our encounter with joyful 
experiences.  
 
 
TF: Are there particular technologies that you perceive as more generative of the 
kind of sociality described by assemblage theory? Or does all technology 
inevitably produce this sort of sociality because it is in the nature of humans (and 
the technologies they use) to do so? 
 
TDS: Well, yes to the second point, to some extent. There’s been a great deal of 
excitement around Tarde’s revival and his work’s relevance to the current 
network paradigm. This is not, however, because he anticipated the internet, but 
because he helps to develop an understanding of how imitation is generative of 
the social. So yes, virality didn’t start with the internet. Whether or not it’s a crowd 
or a digital network, these kinds of contagion spread through the social: they 
produce it. After all, a crowd is a network and network is a crowd. Technologies 
just seem to speed up and intensify this tendency to imitate, pass on and 
differentiate.  
 
Tarde also provides a nice counterpoint to the extension of the Durkheimian 
concept of collective consciousness to the internet model. There was a lot of 
cultural optimism surrounding the idea that a smart collective cognition could 
emerge from the component parts of the network. This is how the computer/mind 
metaphor of cognitive science became the mega brain of the internet age in the 
late 1990s. I much prefer to apply Tarde’s cultural pessimism to the age of 
networks; that is to say, rather than being a collective consciousness the social is 
a network of mostly nonconscious associations.  
 
With regard to this being solely about human nature; that’s a different question. 
I’m more interested in the processes of relational encounter than I am human 
nature. I’m not an essentialist in that sense.  
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